This paper adopts the comparative approach in its bid to compare the excep- The rationale is to critically examine the differences and commonalities of the Companies Acts of both the UK and Ghana. The article argues that minority shareholders in Ghana are given more protection in terms of the avenues opened to them to bring actions against the company or the controlling majority shareholders as compared to what pertains in the United Kingdom.
Introduction
The rule in Foss v Harbottle is widely acknowledged as the deepest mystery of company law, and to a greater extend, of great practical importance to lawyers. It is important for a lawyer to be able to decide whether the client's claim would be heard by the court, and proceed to determine whether the client's claim falls under any of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, that is, in cases where the claim concerns a company's affairs by a member. The common law excep-1
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As a general rule, individual members of a company do not have the right to sue to compel a company to conform to its articles of association and memorandum of association, referred to as the Regulations under the Companies Act 1963, (Act 179) of Ghana, thus suit against the company, or to enforce a claim belonging to the company, that is, suit on behalf of the company. The common law position is that if a member is dissatisfied with a decision of the board of directors or the majority of shareholders and brings an action in court, the company can properly and successfully object to the member's standing to sue, or the court, whether on the application of the company or on its own motion, may stay proceedings. The common law takes the position that even if there has been an irregularity or breach of the Regulations (articles of association and memorandum of association), so long as the irregularity or breach can be redeemed by the passing of an ordinary resolution, the aggrieved member is potentially, if not in fact, deprived of the right to successfully sue.
The limitation on the member's or minority's right to sue is known as the rule in Foss v Harbottle. In this case, two shareholders in a company incorporated by statue (Victoria Park Co.), sued the company's five directors and others, alleging that the property of the company had been misapplied and wasted and that certain mortgages were improperly given over the company's property. The plaintiffs sought an order for the defendants to render account and for the appointment of a receiver. The Court of Chancery declined to intervene in a matter that the company could settle for itself or regularize if an irregularity existed. It was the company itself, which, prima facie, had the sole right to sue for wrongs done to it. Wigram V-C reasoned that it would be an exercise in futility for the court to do what the company could easily and validly undo. He stated that: "How then can this court act in a suit constituted as this is, if it is to be assumed, for the purposes of argument, that the powers of the body of the proprietors are still in existence, and may lawfully be exercised for a purpose like that I have suggested?
Whilst the court may be declaring the acts complained to be void at the suit of the present plaintiffs, who in fact may be the only proprietors who disapprove of them, the governing body of the proprietors may defeat the decree by lawfully resolving upon the confirmation of the very acts which are the subject of the suit. The very fact that the governing body of proprietors assembled at the special general meeting may so bind even a reluctant minority is decisive to show that the frame of this suit cannot be sustained whilst that body retains its functions …"
In short, it was the court's view that so long as the company could confirm or avoid the impugned matter, shareholders could not sue the directors personally, or sue in the company's name in respect of the impugned matter. In dismissing the suit, Wigram V-C went on to say that: "I am of the opinion that this question-the question of confirmation or avoidance-cannot properly be litigated upon this record, regard being had to the existing state and powers of the company, and therefore that part of the bill which seeks to visit the directors personally with the consequences of the impeached mortgages and charges, the benefit of which the company enjoys, is in the same predicament as that which relates to the other subjects of complaint. Both questions stand on the same ground, and, for the reasons which I stated in considering the former point, these demurrers must be allowed."
The rule in Foss v Harbottle has been widely applied in Ghana. In Appenteng & Others v Bank of West Africa Ltd. & Others, 2 the plaintiffs sued in their capacity as shareholders for negligent advice given by the Bank to a company, thus Mpotimma Ltd. They alleged that they had suffered loss which was personal and individual to them. It fell to the High Court to decide whether they had standing to institute the action. The applicability of Foss v Harbottle was not in issue, but whether as a matter of law, the plaintiffs fell within any of the exceptions to permit them to sue. Ollenu J stated that: "Again on the principle laid down in Foss v Harbottle and Edwards v Halliwell 3 that to redress a wrong done to a company or to recover money or damages due to it the action must be brought by the company itself. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that in this case the corporate wrong has affected the individual rights of shareholders therefore comes within the exceptions to the general principle". 4 While accepting the statement of the law, Ollenu J however rejected the contention that the plaintiffs fell within an exception in the instant case. The court held that an individual right, the invasion of which will give a shareholder a cause of action for wrong done to the corporate body, must be a legal right, a right which is enforceable at law. It is true that the purpose with which a shareholder invests his money in a company is that the company should be a going concern and be able to declare profits and pay dividends. But a shareholder has no legal right that a company should always be a going concern. If the company should make profits and pay dividends, good luck to him, if it should declare loss and be unable to pay dividends then that's just too bad, he cannot sue anyone to compel profits to be declared. He has a legal right that he should be paid a share of the profits proportionate to his investment, and he can enforce payment of that share to him. It follows from this that loss of business interests and yearly profits and dividends do not constitute an invasion of any legal rights of the plaintiffs (shareholders of Mpotimma Ltd.). As a result, the plaintiffs did not come within the exception to the general principle; they had no claim.
The rule in Foss v Harbottle which limits the individual's right to sue the company for various decisions the company may have taken, has been justified on several grounds. The first justification is the corporate status argument, namely, the existence of the separate and distinct status of the company. As such, the company alone should have status to inflict or suffer injury and it alone can sue and be sued, not aggrieved members for or against it. Secondly, there is the majority rule justification, namely, that one has to defer to the decision of the majority, despite one's difference therewith. As such, if the majority of directors or shareholders, through ordinary resolution have, or can take certain measures, these measures taken or proposed should be respected. Thirdly, there is judicial reluctance in making business decisions or interfering with business policies. Courts do not wish to second-guess the propriety or soundness of business decisions that have been made, or remedied, in compliance with statutory provisions and the Regulations. It is not the court's function to make management decisions or formulate business policies in place of the board of directors or other business decisions resolved by the majority of members, as the case may be. In addition, the courts will not make orders in vain. So long as any defect can be readily remedied by ordinary resolution, it is actually or potentially fruitless for judicial intervention. For the foregoing reasons, there are indeed strict limits on minority directors', members', and minority members' right to sue on behalf or against the company.
However 
Shortcomings of the Exceptions to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle
1) Suit to protect personal rights: A member does not have an absolute right to sue. In seeking to bring an action under this exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, there are a couple of hurdles to overcome. First, the bar on enforcing so-called "outsider" rights conferred on a member by the articles of association. This hurdle encompasses the difficulties surrounding the enforceability of rights purportedly conferred on a member by the articles of association and in addi-tion, the distinction between insider rights, which are enforceable by virtue of the statutory contract, and outsider rights which, traditionally at least, are viewed as not enforceable. Secondly, in MacDougall v Gardiner, 5 the Court of Appeal reasoned that, if every irregularity could be litigated by a member, "then if there happens to be one cantankerous member, or one who loves litigation, everything of this kind (as on the facts) will be litigated".
2) Illegality and ultra vires the company: A careful analysis of case law indicates that the courts are not consistent as to what actually constitute "ultra vires the company". Each action brought by a minority member will depend on the circumstances and the particular judge, and this does not put the mind of the minority shareholder at rest when contemplating legal action to seek redress under the illegality and ultra vires the company "so-called" exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.
In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd. Fraud has therefore been held to include the expropriation of company property, thus Cooks v Deeks, 13 where the Privy Council held that the directors held the benefit of the contract on constructive trust for the company (Dignam & Lowry, 2009: p. 184 ). There has also been some debate over whether de facto control is sufficient or de jure control must be established to satisfy the element of "wrongdoer in control". The Court of Appeal took a realistic view of the meaning of "control", noting that it should not necessarily be limited to de jure control, but that it could encompass the situation where the majority vote is made up of those votes "cast by the delinquent himself plus those voting with him as a result of influence or apathy".
Despite the wider definitions given to fraud and wrongdoer in control above, which appeared to have given the minority much room to seek redress under this heading from a stand point of view, the "control" requirement was diluted These statutory exceptions, which are the main focus of this study, are comparatively examined next.
Statutory Exceptions under the UK Companies Act 2006 to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle
The most important of these include: Action for "unfairly prejudicial conduct" 
Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct under s. 994 of UK Companies Act 2006
In respect of "unfairly prejudicial conduct", a member can bring an action under CA 2006 s. 994 (1). The requirement under this section that the conduct is not only prejudicial to the rights of shareholders but also that it is unfairly prejudicial, is important as anyone who losses a vote could claim that their interests have been prejudiced, but there is clearly nothing wrong with losing a vote (Taylor, 2009: p. 92 ). Neil LJ stated in Re Saul D Harrison and Sons Plc 14 that, the words "unfairly prejudicial are general words and should be applied flexibly to meet the circumstances of the particular case". The most common remedy sought is an order that the majority purchase the minority's shares at a price that reflects their proportion of the company's value (Sealy & Worthington, 2013: p. 710 ).
Criticisms of s. 994 (1) of the UK Companies Act 2006
The most common criticism under this part is that a controlling majority of members have unfairly prejudiced the minority. A petition for relief of unfairly prejudicial conduct of a company's affairs may be presented by a person who joined the company in the knowledge that its affairs were being conducted in the manner complained of (Bermuda Cablevision Ltd v Colica Trust Co Ltd.). 21 Lawyers presenting a case on unfair prejudice in a company often deal with the whole history of the company in detail, so as to build up an overall picture of the prejudice, and this is countered by equally extensive evidence and cross-examination from the other side. The result can easily be that costs exceed the value of the assets being fought over, as was the case in Re Elgindata Ltd., 22 where costs of £320,000 were incurred arguing over shares worth a mere £24,600.
As a result of the above inherent problems of costs and delay associated with a petition of unfairly prejudicial conduct, in its report titled: Shareholder Remedies (Law is wider than the common law action it replaces in so far as it is in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust by a director (Judge, 2010 (Judge, -2011 . Significantly, under the statutory procedure, there is no need to demonstrate "fraud on the minority" and "wrongdoer control", so that even where the defendant director has acted in good faith and has not gained personally, a claim can nevertheless be brought (Pavlides v Jensen). 24 Section 260 (3) also makes it clear that a derivative claim may be brought, for example against a third party who dishonestly assists a director's breach of fiduciary duty or one who knowingly receives property in breach of a fiduciary duty. Furthermore, it is immaterial whether the cause of action arose before or after the person seeking to bring or continue the derivative claim became a member of the company (s. 260 (4)) (Dignam & Lowry, 2009: p. 187 ).
Criticisms of ss. 260-264 (Derivative Claim)
Section 261 of CA 2006 provides that, once a derivative claim has been brought, the member must apply to the court for permission to continue it. Section 263 (2) sets out the criteria which the court must take into account when determining whether to grant permission to a member to continue a derivative claim. This criterion, it is argued, is a bar to a derivative claim proceeding. The requirement that the court should take into account the importance that a director acting in accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company would attach to the claim appears to dispense with the old common law prerequisite of "wrongdoer control". The list of factors to be taken into account for determining the refusal of permission is supplemented by s. 263 (3) which sets out the factors which the court must, in particular, take into account when exercising its discretion to grant permission to continue a derivative claim.
Comparing the language of ss. 261-264 with the common law rules it replaces shows that there is little or no change of emphasizes in terms of formulation.
The focus of the rule laid down in Foss v Harbottle and its jurisprudence was on prohibiting claims unless one of the exceptions to the rule was satisfied. The statutory language similarly proceeds from the rather negative standpoint that the court must dismiss the application or claim in the circumstances specified in ss. 261 (2), 262 (3), 263 (2)-(3) and 264 (3).
To compound the inherent difficulties associated with derivative claims, legal aid has never been available to those seeking to bring a derivative action and so view that contingency fees could be used to fund such actions. The CA 2006 further failed to make provision for the remedies available in a derivative claim.
In addition to the above hindrances to derivative claims, where a company goes into liquidation, the court will not allow a derivative action to be brought or continued because the liquidator then has the statutory power to litigate in the company's name (IA 1986, s. 165 (3) 28 and stressed that in determining whether to permit a derivative action to continue, the shareholder must establish a positive case for being allowed to sue on behalf of the company, and that the shareholder would be allowed to do so only if two conditions are satisfied, namely that, he is bringing the action bona fide for the benefit of the company, and secondly, that no other adequate remedy is available. This requirement only goes to further compound the woes of the minority shareholder in the quest to protect his rights.
Just and Equitable Winding up under Section 122 of UK Insolvency Act 1986
The final statutory exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle in the UK, is an application for the "just and equitable winding up" of the company under s. 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), as an option of last resort. Obviously, this is a very serious course of action as it means that an otherwise successful company may be forced to cease trading. For this reason, the court will only make such an order in exceptional circumstances.
In Re Bleriot Manufacturing Aircraft Co Ltd., 29 Neville J stated that, the words "just and equitable, are words of the widest significance, and do not limit the jurisdiction of the court to any case. It is a question of fact, and each case must depend on its own circumstances".
A contributory petitioning under IA 1986, s. 122 (1) (g) may rely "upon any circumstances of justice or equity which affect him in his relation with the company, or ... with the other shareholders", per Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.
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Unless the articles of association of a company provide otherwise, a member cannot make it wind up voluntarily other than by obtaining a three-quarters majority at a general meeting. A person must accept, on joining a company that leaving the company is subject to this fundamental restriction. A contributory presenting a just and equitable petition is claiming that it is just and equitable to waive this restriction. The essential question on a contributory's petition, "is whether members who do not desire to stay in a company should be entitled to 26 [1986] 
Minority Shareholder Protection in Ghana
In 
Representative Actions
Section 21 of Act 179, provides for Representative Actions. This is where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a right that he enjoys by virtue of being a member of a class, or seeks relief because he suffers burdens as a member of a certain class, or he seeks to enforce compliance with the company's Regulations. Usually, the registration of the Regulations of a company has three effects. First, the registered Regulations constitute a contract under seal between the company and its members and officers, and between the members and the officers themselves.
Furthermore, where the Regulations empower an individual to appoint or remove any director or officer of the company, such a person is vested with these powers of appointment, whether such a person is a member/officer of the company or not.
As a result of the above provisions, the claimant, being a member or officer of the company, who brings an action to enforce compliance of the Regulations, shall do so on his own behalf and on behalf of the other members and officers
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s. 217, the court may order that the member post security for the company's cost, and the court may also direct that the application is heard in chambers. The essence for an application for security for costs is to give the defendant peace of mind in instances where the application brought by the member is unmeritorious, frivolous or vexatious. The defendant's costs associated with defending the suit can then be defrayed from the moneys posted as security. The fact that the minority member may be required by the court to post security, which he is likely to lose, may deter minority members from instituting actions under s. 217
of Act 179. Furthermore, only members may apply for a section 217 remedy.
Remedy against Oppression under s. 218 of Act 179
A final statutory exception to be considered is the "remedy against oppression".
This covers twelve instances, each of which entitles a member or debentureholder of the company to apply for the appropriate judicial relief. Some of these 
Criticisms of s. 218 of Act 179
The phrase remedy against oppression, is misleading. An act of oppression can, but does not necessarily entitle an applicant to a remedy under s. 218. In Pinamang v Abrokwa, 35 the Court of Appeal held that an applicant who seeks a section 218 remedy, "must adduce evidence seeking to show a chain of events and occurrences of harsh and burdensome conduct which continued up to the date of presentation of the petition". This requirement to some extent, may be burdensome on the applicant.
Conclusion
To draw a curtain on this study, it is of paramount importance to emphasize that there is no perfect law anywhere in the world. With this as a yardstick, one is therefore on the "hunt" for a law with minimal defects when undertaking a comparative statutory study as is the case in this research. ted that its wording is similar to the common law exception it purports to replace, therefore, it offers no extra protection to the minority shareholder than the common law. Also, under s. 122 (1) (g) of the Insolvency Act 1986, the requirement that the circumstance of the minority shareholder's claim is exceptional, appears not to be helpful. Suffice is to say that the avenues opened to members to sue under representative actions of s. 21 of Act 179, are broad and straightforward. The major criticism of this section being that the litigant(s) alone will bear the cost of the suit, even though the benefits would be for all if successful, is easily overcome by seeking the permission of all concerned members before instituting the claim. On the issue of the likelihood of losing security posted in an action by a member for injunction or declaration in the event of illegal or irregular activity under s. 217 of Act 179, it is a well-established fact that profits go with loses, therefore, security posted before a case is heard, is nothing untoward or punitive. It is just a devise to sieve out frivolous and vexatious actions.
Finally, the holding of the Ghanaian Court of Appeal that an applicant who seeks a section 218 remedy, "must adduce evidence seeking to show a chain of events and occurrences of harsh and burdensome conduct which continued up to the date of presentation of the petition", is a requirement that any minority member who genuinely seeks protection under the section, should be able to meet. Cataloguing a chain of events and instances of harsh and burdensome conduct, may not be that "burdensome". Minutes of meetings could be of great help in this regard.
It is evident that Act 179 permits the individual the right to sue, thereby reversing the previous common law principle that barred a suit so long as the breach was capable of being remedied by an ordinary resolution, thus s. 217 (1). Furthermore, unless the company actually remedies a breach by passing a curative resolution, the individual's suit may succeed. The limitations on the individuals' right to sue in respect of various corporate acts, transactions and resolutions have therefore been eased somewhat by Act 179. It also appears that the Ghanaian courts have a "soft spot", for the minority shareholder when it comes to asserting his rights, than the UK courts, as evidenced in the discussion above.
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